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INTRODUCTION
Health services and modern medicines are out of 
reach for over one billion people globally (1). In 
many countries, including Bangladesh, barriers to 
public-health facilities force the poor to pay for 
healthcare out-of-pocket, often driving the poor 
further into poverty. Although a system of univer-
sal coverage may be ideal in many cases, there is a 
need for interim strategies to reduce out-of-pocket 
expenditure on health. Such strategies include mix-
es of community cooperative- and enterprise-based 
health insurance and social health insurance-type 
coverage for specific groups. 
Micro-insurance is an emerging sector, strongly 
linked to the microcredit movement in Bangladesh. 
Despite the extensive reach of microcredit in South 
Asia, micro-insurance is still a nascent sector, with 
approximately 36.9 million lives in South Asia cov-
ered by some form of micro-insurance (2). There is 
substantial diversity in the programmes being of-
fered in the subcontinent. This case study assessed 
the poverty and health impact of micro-insurance 
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for health in Bangladesh, comparing these with the 
micro-insurance programmes for health in India.  
This case study analysis of micro-insurance as a po-
tential mechanism to address social exclusion draws 
from peer-reviewed and grey literature on micro- 
insurance for health. Two basic questions with re-
gard to micro-insurance for health were addressed: 
(a) Does micro-insurance for health increase access 
to, and use of, basic health services among exclud-
ed populations? and (b) Does micro-insurance 
for health reduce the likelihood that health costs 
will  be  a  catastrophic  expense  for  marginalized 
households?
Given the constraints of the existing literature and 
the scope of this exercise, the analysis is indicative.   
POTENTIAL OF MICRO-INSURANCE  
FOR HEALTH TO REDUCE EXLCUSION 
FROM HEALTH SERVICES
Micro-insurance is designed generally to address 
economic exclusion from resources, services, and/
or social protection in the cases of death, ill-health, 
or another adverse life-event. Micro-insurance for 
health is also designed to rectify spatial exclusion 
from health services and cultural exclusion of wom-
en from health services. This case study focuses on 
the extent to which the micro-insurance schemes 
for health address spatial and economic barriers to 
healthcare among marginalized groups.  Werner WJ Micro-insurance in Bangladesh
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Generally, people in rural areas in Bangladesh have 
lower access to public services and private-sector 
resources. The primary manifestation of spatial ex-
clusion in healthcare is the lack of access to health 
services for women, rural people, and the poor. In 
Bangladesh, there are only 26 doctors and 30 hos-
pital beds for every 100,000 people (3). Most of these 
resources are located in urban areas. Motivation for 
the micro-insurance schemes for health was, in 
many cases, driven by this spatial exclusion in ac-
cess to health services. Microcredit organizations, 
for example, began providing micro-insurance for 
health because their members could not access state-
run health clinics (4). 
The poor have traditionally faced barriers to health 
services due to their poverty. Bangladesh has one 
of the highest rates of reliance on out-of-pocket 
health expenses in Asia. Out-of-pocket health ex-
penses have negative consequences in the use of 
health services and overall living standards, prima-
rily due to the unpredictable nature of out-of-pocket 
expenses (5). A significant portion of healthcare ex-
penses in Bangladesh are privately funded, mostly 
as out-of-pocket expenses. Private sources finance 
71% of national health expenditure; 88% of the 
costs for health in private sources is out-of-pocket 
expenditure (3) [Health costs in private facilities in 
Bangladesh comprised 88% out-of-pocket expendi-
ture, 10% non-profit institutions serving house-
holds, and 0.8% pre-paid and risk-pooling plans 
(3)]. More than 70% of the out-of-pocket expenses 
are for medicines, which reflects the high preva-
lence of self-medication due primarily to lower ac-
cess to services for constraints relating to income 
and distance (5). Households, on average, spend 
5% of household expenditure on out-of-pocket 
health costs (6). Free public-health services for the 
urban and rural poor only exist theoretically. The 
poor are largely excluded from the public facilities 
that do exist due to lack of money (for bakshish or 
bribes) or connections.  
The actual distribution of health subsidies is not 
pro-poor. The poorest 20% of the population ac-
tually received only 16% of government health 
subsidies (7). If access to subsidized healthcare was 
targeted towards the poor, the share of the subsidy 
received by the poorest quintile would be greater 
than 20%. Therefore, households with lower in-
come and lower disposable income have reduced 
capacity to access health services.  
High out-of-pocket health expenses leave a house-
hold vulnerable to the effects of catastrophic health 
expenses. Catastrophic health costs are those that 
severely disrupt household living standards by 
absorbing a large fraction (10-40%) of household 
resources. Xu et al. found that catastrophic health 
expenditure is most likely to occur when health 
services require payment (i.e. are not free), house-
holds have a low capacity to pay, and in the ab-
sence of prepayment or health insurance (6). In 
Asia, Bangladesh has the highest incidence of cata-
strophic health payments. Using the measure of 
40% of non-food expenditure as the standard for 
‘catastrophic expenses’, 7% of households had expe-
rienced a catastrophic expense in the previous year. 
If the standard for ‘catastrophic’ drops to 15%, 25% 
of the population had experienced catastrophic ex-
penses in the same time period (5). In Bangladesh, 
catastrophic out-of-pocket health payments could 
account for as much as 3.8% of the population fall-
ing below the poverty-line of $1 per day (5).  
Even for those households with the ability and 
funds to access basic health services, catastrophic 
health costs can push the household into poverty. 
In reaction to a catastrophic health expense, house-
holds can sell assets, access credit (from relatives, 
community, and money-lenders), or find addition-
al sources of income. Additional income can come 
from reduction in consumption or increasing wage 
labour by other household members, including 
child labour (8). The impact of health on house-
hold wealth cannot be overstated. Ill-health causes 
a loss of income in two ways. First, the cost of treat-
ment can, in many cases, use all income, and the 
household will be forced to borrow funds. This is 
especially true in Bangladesh where household out-
of-pocket is high. Second, lost income due to ina-
bility to work, both on the part of the ill household 
member and others who need to care for him/her, 
reduces current and future flow of income. Since 
poor households are largely rely on daily-wage in-
come, its loss, coupled with high medical costs, can 
be crippling (2).  
The health and economic status of socially-ex-
cluded populations is, therefore, based on access to 
both health facilities and ability to pay. Ability to 
pay can be further disaggregated into: (a) ongoing, 
low-cost basic and preventative health costs (2) and 
(b) high catastrophic health costs. To establish the 
impact of micro-insurance for health on the use 
of health services and, by extension, health and 
economic status, the impact on both types of costs 
should be examined.Werner WJ Micro-insurance in Bangladesh
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MICRO-INSURANCE FOR HEALTH 
IN BANgLADESH wITH CONTRASTS 
FROM INDIA
As microcredit has proven, financial services, such 
as access to credit, can have a positive impact on 
poor populations and can reach sustainability of 
market. Micro-insurance encompasses a range of 
different insurance services aimed at poor popula-
tions. Insurance can be even more important for 
low-income groups as they are more vulnerable to 
ill-health or death, unexpected expenses, and nat-
ural disasters. Micro-insurance is different from 
traditional insurance due to its lower premiums 
and lower profit margins; it is, therefore, of critical 
importance that micro-insurance systems are well- 
administered, cost-efficient, and delivered on a large 
scale. Despite the large natural market for micro- 
insurance, the penetration of these products is quite 
low throughout developing countries. A recent glo-
bal survey of micro-insurance estimates that 78.5 
million lives are covered by micro-insurance, and 
6.5 million lives are covered in Bangladesh, leav-
ing 90-94% of the poor without micro-insurance 
coverage (2).  
Globally, most micro-insurance policies are offered 
by private insurers (2). In Bangladesh, microcredit 
organizations are a prominent delivery channel and 
providers of micro-insurance. In many cases, life 
insurance is required for borrowers. As the concept 
of risk protection can be misunderstood among tar-
get populations, micro-insurance programmes use 
microlending, health outreach, and community 
information networks to market their products. 
Given that microcredit organizations have gained a 
high level of trust in the community, this has been 
a successful strategy (4).
There are three major types of micro-insurance of-
fered in Bangladesh: health, life, and integrated. 
This case study discuses diverse examples of micro-
insurance for health in Bangladesh and presents 
contrasting micro-insurance schemes for health 
from India.
Micro-health insurance in Bangladesh
In Bangladesh, all the micro-insurance schemes 
(Table 1) for health follow the strategy of provid-
ing  essential health services through low service 
pricing and affordable premium collection from a 
large group of the disadvantaged people. The health 
schemes in India have taken a different approach, 
covering some high-cost services and integrating 
health insurance with life and asset protection.  
Table 1. Micro-insurance schemes in Bangla- 
desh (4)
Type of insurance
No. of schemes 
(n=36)
Health 13
Life 12
Loans/capital 8
Livestock 2
Disaster 1
In Bangladesh, micro-insurance for health is prima-
rily provided by non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) which also provide corollary health serv-
ices and microcredit. Most micro-insurance pro-
grammes for health are linked to microloans and 
are reliant on the group dynamics of microcredit. 
For instance, the Society for Social Service requires 
every borrower to take out a health card for Tk 20 
(US$ 0.29) that enrolls them in the micro-insurance 
scheme for health. Most schemes run community-
based clinics staffed by medical professionals and 
paramedics and include labouratory facilities. Two 
schemes  have  large  hospitals  but  other  schemes 
use referrals for secondary and tertiary care (9). Co- 
payments are required to reduce frivolous or unnec-
essary health consumption on the part of clients but 
co-payment amounts are designed to be affordable 
[The tendency to partake in unnecessary proce-
dures or neglect prevention is referred to, in eco-
nomic theory, as ‘moral hazard’ because the cost to 
the client is a small portion of the overall cost, and 
the client may, therefore, not take the full econom-
ic cost (i.e. price) into account when weighing the 
cost and benefits]. Most micro-insurance schemes 
for health have provision for the poorest to receive 
benefits without premium of co-payments.
Basic and preventive health services are covered by 
micro-insurance for health, including immuniza-
tions, family planning, consultation, and normal 
deliveries. Discounts are provided on medicines 
and pathology tests. Generally, hospitalization is 
covered up to Tk 1,000 (US$ 14). The Society for 
Social Services is the lone benefit package that cov-
ers surgeries, for a co-payment of Tk 3,000 (US$ 44) 
(Appendix).  
The top three micro-insurance healthcare providers 
hold 115,000 policies, covering more than 550,000 
people (10). However, micro-insurance for health 
only covers a limited number of districts in Bangla-
desh. The micro-insurance schemes for health tar-
get women and the poor, both microcredit mem-
bers and others living in the areas covered by the 
schemes (9). These organizations have deliberately Werner WJ Micro-insurance in Bangladesh
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overlooked the risks of selecting a group of clients 
who have similar and possibly correlated health 
risks and have enrolled members without any res-
trictions (10). This lack of selectivity is consist-
ent with the objectives of equity and community 
health; however, the micro-insurance organiza-
tions may be taking on a higher level of risk which 
needs to be adequately managed. 
Most NGOs operating micro-insurance schemes 
for health in Bangladesh receive external fund-
ing to subsidize their programmes; only the Socie-
ty for Social Service and the Dhaka Community 
Hospital have achieved 100% recovery rate. Most 
micro-insurance schemes cross-subsidize ultra-poor 
participants from other subscribers. However, nei-
ther of the financially-viable programmes do this 
(9). Typical insurance programmes take 3-5 years 
to reach sustainability.  Given that micro-insurance 
schemes are much more challenging, financial sus-
tainability could take 7-10 years (11). For example, 
cost-recovery is higher when the number of policy-
holders is broad-based and large. The cost-recovery, 
subsidization, and funding profile of Bangladesh 
micro-health insurance schemes for health largely 
reflect the design and funding priorities (Table 2). 
To date, these schemes were additions to micro-
credit programmes or mechanisms to increase ac-
cess to primary healthcare.  
The micro-insurance schemes for health in Bangla-
desh have a number of common challenges. First, 
there is a general lack of understanding among the 
target market of insurance as a risk-management 
tool and a general aversion to paying for health serv-
ices unless facing an illness or accident. Insurance 
premiums are largely seen as expenditure rather 
than an investment to protect assets and future in-
come (10). Second, health service expectations are 
difficult to manage. Clients may have expectations 
that quality healthcare includes procedures that are, 
in many cases, unnecessary. For instance, patients 
Table 2. Cost-recovery for micro-insurance schemes for health in Bangladesh (4)
Organization Recovery rate (%)
Cross subsidization 
(Y/N)
External funding 
(Y/N)
BRAC 50-60 Y Y
Grameen Kalyan 77 Y Y
Dhaka Community Hospital 100 N N
Dushtha Shasthya Kendra  NA Y Y
Nari Uddug Kendra  10 Y N
Sajida Foundation 53 Y Y
Society for Social Services 100 N N
N=No; NA=Not available; Y=Yes
may want a saline-drip for diarrhoea when oral hy-
dration may be more effective and cost-efficient. 
Health education can affect perceptions of patients 
about required health services. Perceptions of the 
quality of healthcare have important implications 
for micro-insurance subscriptions and re-enrollment 
and, therefore, for overall financial viability of pro-
grammes (11). Third, controlling healthcare costs is 
generally a challenge for health-insurance compa-
nies, and micro-insurance is no different. One solu-
tion is to have a ceiling on the amount of benefits 
available, or to limit the recovery-time but such 
limitations transfer the financial burden back to 
clients and make the scheme less attractive to po-
tential clients (10). The micro-insurance schemes 
for health in Bangladesh have largely tended to 
maintain affordability by limiting the services pro-
vided. Fourth, to move towards financial viability 
and accurately assess the impact and success of the 
insurance products, robust management informa-
tion systems are required. Save for the largest in-
surers, most organizations do not have adequate 
management information systems to provide data 
on clients and claims (10). Fifth, healthcare costs, 
low re-enrollment rates, and a limited number of 
subscribers have, with a few exceptions, prevented 
the micro-insurance schemes for health in Bangla-
desh from achieving independent financial viabi-
lity, i.e. they are reliant on donor-funding to cover 
shortfalls. Since sustainability has recently become 
increasingly important and technical assistance has 
been provided to improve management systems 
and quality of product, many of these issues will be 
or are being addressed. Even so, financial viability 
may still be some years in the future (9).  
As the above discussion demonstrates, the micro-
insurance schemes for health in Bangladesh are 
designed to increase the use of, and access to, basic 
and preventative healthcare. Insurance products 
are designed to provide primary care at affordable 
prices but do not cover high-cost/low-frequency Werner WJ Micro-insurance in Bangladesh
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health services. For instance, only one scheme cov-
ers surgeries, and none explicitly covers caesarean 
delivery or emergency obstetric care.  
There is clearly scope and need to expand even the 
basic and preventative micro-insurance for health 
both for microcredit borrowers and non-borrow-
ers. Slightly less than seven million lives of a popu-
lation  of  more  than  140  million  are  covered  in 
Bangladesh. Results of a study of rickshaw-pullers 
in Dhaka showed that NGOs were the most promi-
nent source of formal sector credit but accounted 
for only 2% of medical treatment received (12). 
The same study has shown that financing health-
care was one of the top three reasons for borrowing 
by rickshaw-pullers. Extension of microcredit rela-
tionship to include health insurance could give the 
poor greater access to medical services. Micro-insur-
ance part—of the microcredit system and separate 
from it—has significant potential to improve the 
health status of the poor. 
Micro-insurance for health in India: Yeshasvini 
Cooperative Farmers Health Scheme
The Yeshasvini Cooperative Farmers Health 
Scheme—started in 2003 in Karnataka—covers 
1.45 million members (at its zenith there were 2.2 
million members which fell after premiums were 
doubled). The insurance is offered in partnership 
with cooperatives which has been an effective distri-
bution channel but outreach to women is limited as 
cooperative members are primarily men. Yeshavini 
was designed to be self-financed but the Indian Gov-
ernment insisted on subsidizing the premium (13).
In contrast to micro-insurance for health in Bangla-
desh, the benefit package focuses on high-cost/low-
frequency events. Over 1,600 different surgeries are 
covered at the network hospitals where there are 
fixed prices for each surgery, including connected 
costs, e.g. follow-up consultations. Network hospi-
tals are mainly private hospitals. The prices fixed 
by Yeshavini with participating hospitals are about 
30% below the average price charged (13).  
The maximum benefit per person per year is Rs 
200,000 (US$ 4,550) for an annual premium of Rs 
120. Benefits also include free outpatient treatment. 
The insurer pays the healthcare provider for pre- 
approved surgeries and outpatient treatment; so, 
the service is cashless to the policy-holder (13).
Risk-management through integrated insurance: 
VimoSEwA in India
VimoSEWA, started offering an integrated insur-
ance product in 1992 and is a trust operated by the 
SEWA Union which also includes rural coopera-
tives, microcredit, trade facilitation centres, health 
services, SEWA bank, a housing trust, and daycare 
services. VimoSEWA has strong links with other 
parts of the SEWA Union, particularly in distribu-
tion and marketing of insurance products. Over 
time, VimoSEWA has experimented with different 
business models, providing insurance directly and 
with private-sector partners. The liberalization of 
the insurance market and the requirement for pri-
vate-sector insurers to serve the low-income market 
has boosted the ability of VimoSEWA to negotiate 
a package of services that meets the needs of the 
poor. Currently, VimoSEWA uses a partner-agent 
model where the insurer is a private company, and 
VimoSEWA is the distributor and provider of the 
insurance services. Therefore, VimoSEWA carries 
very little insurance risk. This risk-management 
and service model was established after trying dif-
ferent structures and after the experience of severe 
financial liabilities due to a natural disaster.  
In 2001, VimoSEWA developed a business plan 
with the goal of achieving financial sustainability. 
The business plan assumed that the scheme could 
be scaled up to reach 300,000 members and vi-
ability within seven years. However, membership 
remains below the targets, and it is estimated that 
financial viability will not be reached before 2012. 
Low renewal rates have been the primary limiting 
factor in reaching financial viability. Nonetheless, 
the business plan has helped VimoSEWA progress 
towards a more professional approach to the 
scheme. They have improved management skills 
and knowledge, management information system, 
risk management, and setting of objectives.
VimoSEWA offers an integrated insurance prod-
uct, including life, widow insurance in the event 
of death of spouse, health, and asset insurance. 
Only women can take out a policy but they can 
cover themselves and their spouse, or the entire 
family. The integrated insurance product imposes 
risk-pooling on members and reduces adverse se-
lection for specific types of insurance. In fact, the 
insurance is marketed as a community risk-man-
agement tool, not a benefit scheme. Health insur-
ance is the most-used benefit. The average submit-
ted claim is Rs 2,670 (US$ 61), and 51% of claims 
reach the maximum benefit. 
One important lesson that micro-insurance can 
learn from VimoSEWA is the need for re-insurance 
to manage risk. In 2001, VimoSEWA was self-insur-
ing, i.e. providing insurance directly without the Werner WJ Micro-insurance in Bangladesh
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backing of a private-sector insurer. In January of 
that year, the earthquake devastated the Gujarat 
state. Claims under the asset and loss component 
of their insurance were over US$ 75,000, which put 
VimoSEWA under severe financial strain. Prior to 
the Gujarat earthquake, annual pay-outs for asset 
protection were less than US$ 662. Re-insurance 
would have covered this type of covariate risk; it is 
commonly used by insurance companies to cover 
the major catastrophic events when claims far ex-
ceed those in an average year. This example illus-
trates that, to provide support properly when the 
poor need it most, micro-insurers must follow the 
professional norms of standard insurance compa-
nies, particularly when it comes to management of 
risk (14).
IMPACT ON EXCLUSION FROM HEALTH 
SERVICES
The examples shown demonstrate that micro-
insurance for health can reduce exclusion from 
basic health services. While in Bangladesh, focus 
of micro-insurance for health on primary health 
service does not fully address economic exclusion 
from essential, high-cost healthcare, the micro-
insurance schemes for health in Bangladesh have 
increased access to basic health services for the 
poor, particularly the female participants. Having 
the micro-insurance-affiliated medical facilities en-
courages participants to seek medical advice from 
formally-trained care providers in the early stage of 
an illness. Previously, initial medical advice would 
be taken from traditional practitioners or be self-
treated. Only once an illness became serious, would 
formal medical advice be sought (10).  
The micro-insurance schemes for health in Bang-
ladesh have been structured to enhance capa-
bilities, resources, and skills of women. As such, 
they can reduce the exclusion of women from ba-
sic resources of the society. However, the strength 
of the relationship between micro-insurance for 
health and reduced social exclusion of women in 
Bangladesh has yet to be quantified. 
Women are the primary and target market for mi-
cro-insurance for health. In most cases in Bangla-
desh, household medical services covered by insur-
ance are accessed through female card-holders. In 
the case of facilities established by the micro-insur-
ance  schemes for health, clinics are largely run by 
women, and women are trained as professional 
health workers to service the majority of female 
clientele (11). Through micro-insurance facilities 
for health and low or no-cost services, women are 
able to independently access health services with-
out assistance from male family members either 
for funding or transportation. Women can go to 
a local clinic and use an insurance card to receive 
health services. Some micro-insurance schemes 
for health target specific socially-excluded popula-
tions. For example, the Society for Social Services 
has programmes for ethnic minorities, sex workers, 
and working children (10). 
With regard to economic exclusion and healthcare, 
the impact of micro-insurance for health appears to 
be mixed. Micro-insurance may increase access to 
primary healthcare by decreasing the cost of basic 
healthcare, but at least as benefits are designed in 
Bangladesh, micro-insurance for health does not 
reduce the likelihood that health-related costs will 
be a catastrophic expense for a household.
Primary healthcare is extremely important to im-
prove health at the population level in Bangladesh, 
and the micro-insurance schemes for health are 
focused on that segment of healthcare. However, 
there are unmet health needs for surgeries and 
more expensive medical procedures among the 
poor, which remain unaddressed by basic micro- 
insurance for health. For instance, results of re-
search in Bangladesh showed significant inequal-
ities in access to caesarean birth services (Anwar I, 
Collins S, Ronsmans C. A decade of inequality in 
maternity care: trends in professional attendance 
and caesarean section in Bangladesh, 1991-2004. 
Dhaka: International Centre for Diarrhoeal Dis-
ease Research, Bangladesh, 2006 [Unpublished]). 
Among the general population, approximately 10-
15% of deliveries are generally expected to require 
caesarean-section surgery. In Bangladesh, caesar-
ean-section births among the poor are less than 1% 
(Fig.) (ibid). Public-sector services are not meeting 
needs, particularly of the poor and the poorest. As 
currently designed and offered in Bangladesh, the 
micro-insurance schemes for health cannot help 
address this unmet need. As a further example of 
the inability of micro-insurance for health in Bang-
ladesh to address unmet medical needs, the aver-
age claim from VimoSEWA clients is greater than Rs 
2,500 (US$ 57), which is above the maximum ben-
efit for most micro-insurance schemes for health in 
Bangladesh (14).  
In addition, basic health insurance does not address 
catastrophic health expenses, and health costs are 
the most likely cause of a household crisis. The study 
on rickshaw-pullers in Dhaka found that half of cri-
sis-related expenses among respondents were due Werner WJ Micro-insurance in Bangladesh
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to health (12). Costs of a health crisis averaged Tk 
6,000 (US$ 87) among a population in which half 
cannot generate any surplus from income and one-
fifth cannot afford three meals a day. The full eco-
nomic burden of health costs can be catastrophic.   
On top of the direct cost, productivity and, there-
fore, income are likely to be reduced after ill-health, 
which can put a household into a downward spiral. 
Ill-health, crisis expenditure, and lower productivity 
lead to falling incomes, which, in turn, negatively 
affect the health and education status of children, 
leading to lower human capital investment and an 
intergenerational cycle of chronic poverty (12).  
Measures of the poverty impact of healthcare pay-
ments highlight the importance of out-of-pocket 
payments in pushing people into poverty and 
keeping them in poverty. Households are defined 
as being below the poverty-line based on their 
household expenditure. Therefore, high out-of-
pocket health expenditure may actually raise 
spending above this measure of the poverty-line, 
even if health expenditure has been made by re-
ducing food, clothing and shelter expenses to a 
below poverty-line level. To measure the poverty 
impact of health expenditure, out-of-pocket health 
payments  are  subtracted  from  overall  household 
resources to calculate a post-health payment pover-
ty head-count. Excluding payments for healthcare 
from household resources in the 1999-2000 House-
hold Income Expenditure Survey in Bangladesh 
increases the number of people living below US$ 
1 per day by 3.8%, or 4.9 million individuals. The 
same calculation with a US$ 2 per day poverty-line 
increases the poverty head-count by an additional 
3.6%. The same study found that payments for 
healthcare also increase the poverty gap, i.e. the 
amount by which households are below the pov-
erty-line as illustrated in Table 3 (15).
The high rates of out-of-pocket and catastrophic 
health payments exacerbate the prevalence and 
depth of poverty in Bangladesh. Micro-insurance 
for health in Bangladesh does not address this point 
and, hence, is not preventing health expenditure 
from pushing households into poverty and keep-
ing them in poverty.
There is a trade-off among micro-insurance system 
costs, financial viability, and risk protection. Insur-
ance coverage that is affordable and financially vi-
able (covering more limited services) is likely to be 
less successful in avoiding catastrophic health costs 
(16). Therefore, based on this limited analysis, the 
preliminary answers to the questions posed at the 
beginning of the case study are that micro-insur-
ance for health increases access to, and use of, ba-
sic formal-sector health services among excluded 
populations but does not reduce the likelihood 
that health-related costs incurred would be a catas-
trophic expense for a marginalized household, 
pulling the household deeper into poverty.
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of inequality in maternity care: trends in profes-
sional attendance and caesarean section in Bangla-
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Table 3. Poverty impact (%) of out-of-pocket health expenditure for Bangladesh (15)
Poverty impact
Poverty-line
US$ 1 per day US$ 2 per day
Pre-health payment poverty headcount 22.5 73.0
Post-health payment poverty headcount  26.3 76.5
Percentage point increase in poverty 
incidence due to OOP health payments 3.8 3.6
Pre-health payment poverty gap 4.5 27.8
Post-health payment poverty gap 5.3 30.5
Percentage point increase in  poverty gap 
due to OOP health Payments 0.9 2.6
Poverty gap is the average amount by which resources fall short of the poverty-line as a percent-
age of that line; OOP=Out-of-pocketWerner WJ Micro-insurance in Bangladesh
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CURRENT POLICY ACTIONS
In Bangladesh, the insurance industry denationa- 
lized in the mid-1980s is regulated by the Chief 
Controller of Insurance. The Bangladesh Insurance 
(Nationalisation) Order of 1972 and the Insurance 
Act (1938, revised 2001) provide the legislative and 
basis for regulation. Although no direct regulations 
aimed at micro-insurance, a number of provisions 
can potentially impact micro-insurance (17). 
•	 Insurers	cannot	transact	both	life	and	health	
insurance. Therefore, an integrated insurance 
product like that offered by VimoSEWA is prob-
ably not possible in Bangladesh in the current 
regulatory environment.
•	 To	protect	policy-holders,	regulation	limits	in-
surance management expenses to 38% of pre-
miums. Given that micro-insurance typically 
has higher overhead costs (i.e. management 
expenses are a higher percentage of premiums), 
this maximum may limit micro-insurance prod-
ucts and companies, especially at the initial 
stages of introduction.
•	 Qualification	requirements	for	insurance	agents	
may limit the use of microfinance staff for mi-
cro-insurance sales.  
•	 Various	institutional	options	are	available	for	
funding insurance, e.g. mutual insurance and 
provident funds. These options may be appro-
priate for micro-insurance.
•	 Funding	of	the	Insurance	Directorate	through	in-
surance premiums. The Insurance Directorate is 
funded through a 0.15% (scheduled to increase 
to 0.35%) fee on insurance premiums. This in-
crease in the fee (to 0.35%) may negatively im-
pact provision of insurance to the low-income 
market that cannot pay higher premiums (17).
The India examples provide illuminating contrasts 
to the micro-insurance schemes for health in Bang-
ladesh. India liberalized its insurance market in 
1999 when the insurance market was opened to 
private insurers and limited foreign ownership was 
permitted. The Insurance Regulatory and Develop-
ment Authority (IRDA) in India has taken an inter-
est in micro-insurance in a number of ways. First, 
all insurance companies are required to serve rural 
areas  and  persons  below  the  poverty-line.  Each 
private company must insure at least 25,000 low- 
income lives by the end of five years of operations. 
Public insurers must increase the number of low-
income policy-holders each year. For the most part, 
private  insurers  view  this  requirement  as  a  cost 
of doing business and have not pursued the low- 
income segment as a viable market. Second, the 
IRDA has proposed specific micro-insurance regula-
tions. NGOs can only offer micro-insurance in col-
laboration with a regulated insurance company and 
can receive commission from the insurer for services 
provided. The capital requirements are high for mi-
cro-insurers who want to establish a regulated entity 
but can provide insurance through a trust (14).
The insurance and micro-insurance regulatory en-
vironment in India may provide important lessons 
for regulators in other countries. The liberaliza-
tion of the insurance market, combined with the 
requirement for private-sector insurers to serve the 
low-income population, has led to a competitive 
and high-quality micro-insurance market in India.   
DISCUSSION
Different micro-insurance schemes for health 
are designed to solve specific problems. Micro-
insurance for health in Bangladesh appears to 
be designed to increase access to, and use of, ba-
sic healthcare. The Indian schemes, on the other 
hand, are aimed at improving quality and reduc-
ing the income impact of secondary and tertiary 
healthcare. Based on this analysis, to increase the 
impact by better addressing the health needs of the 
poor and the otherwise excluded, micro-insurance 
for health should: (a) cover high cost but necessary 
procedures and (b) expand membership to a wide 
range of low- and middle-income groups to increase 
cross-subsidization and improve financial viability. 
However, further research should establish whether 
micro-insurance for health is suited to addressing 
the basic and catastrophic health expenses. Com-
petition and experimentation can help answer this 
question, when combined with knowledge-sharing 
and critical analysis. 
There is a significant scope and need for donor 
assistance to micro-insurance in general and mi-
cro-insurance schemes for health in particular. 
Technical assistance can help the micro-insurance 
schemes for health improve the management ca-
pacity and systems, including risk-management 
through re-insurance. Technical assistance can also 
focus on connecting micro-insurance to overall de-
velopment of the financial sector. Micro-insurance 
programmes must invest their portfolio of funds in 
a manner that is appropriate to their fiduciary risks 
and that benefits the growth of the community. 
The example of VimoSEWA’s difficulties after earth-
quake in Gujarat demonstrate the need for micro-Werner WJ Micro-insurance in Bangladesh
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insurance programmes to use re-insurance; this re-
quires an understanding (through actuary analysis) 
of the risks that a micro-insurance programme is 
taking and a risk-management strategy. In many 
developing countries, the insurance sector remains 
under-developed. If the design and growth of the 
micro-insurance sector can incorporate modern 
concepts of actuary analysis, management infor-
mation systems, portfolio management, and risk-
management, it will assist the overall development 
of the insurance sector and mobilization of domes-
tic investment capital.
For donors, the guiding principle for identifying 
successful micro-insurance programmes for health 
should be based on both health impact and finan-
cial viability. Micro-insurance managers and donors 
should use financial sustainability as an indicator of 
demand and management skill. The CGAP donor 
guidelines  (http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/donors) 
can provide details of indicators to guide evaluation 
and monitoring. To assist micro-insurers to achieve 
financial viability, donors should have a long-term 
time horizon, provide endowment funding rather 
than subsidizing operational shortfalls, and should 
coordinate their assistance and monitoring require-
ments.  
To design appropriate micro-insurance and micro-
insurance programmes for health, research should 
be carried out to quantify the impact of specific 
types of micro-insurance for health on out-of-pock-
et health expenses; incidence of poverty and pov-
erty gap; inter-generational transfer of poverty; use 
of health services; and household health status.  
Finally, micro-insurance for health and/or its tools 
and methods can be an important part of a coun-
try’s public-health strategy. High levels of catas-
trophic and out-of-pocket payments among the 
poor and ultra-poor could be addressed through a 
micro-insurance system for health that allows serv-
ices to be accessed from public, private, or NGO 
medical facilities. Bangladesh could examine effec-
tive health-card schemes, such as those in place in 
Thailand and Indonesia, to develop public-health 
and micro-insurance schemes that meet the needs 
of the poor and ultra-poor. 
This analysis has limitations. It is based on exist-
ing data; no original data have been presented. 
Clearly, there is a need for dedicated independent 
research, comparing the impact of micro-insurance 
for health and public-sector programmes on reduc-
ing exclusion among target populations. Addition-
ally, there is a need to develop, test, and imple-
ment quantitative indicators that can be used for 
measuring the impact of different interventions on 
changing degrees of spatial and economic exclu-
sion. Such indicators should be used as part of the 
monitoring of the impact of the micro-insurance 
programme for health.
CONCLUSION
This analysis of micro-insurance schemes in Bangla-
desh with contrasting examples from India demon-
strates the potential that these programmes have to 
reduce poverty and otherwise improve the health 
status of the poor. Micro-insurance programmes for 
health have reduced barriers to health services for 
the poor and encouraged them to avail of clinics 
and trained medical care providers for basic and 
preventative healthcare. The rural and urban poor 
have traditionally turned to self-treatment (mini-
mally-trained village pharmacist) or traditional 
healers. Micro-insurance facilitates access to profes-
sional healthcare at early stages and offers opportu-
nities to provide accurate health information and 
primary healthcare interventions. In this way, the 
micro-insurance schemes for health in Bangladeshi 
have increased access to basic healthcare.  
However, there is both demand and necessity for 
surgeries and more expensive medical procedures 
among the poor that remains unaddressed by basic 
micro-insurance for health. Bangladesh has some of 
the highest rates of out-of-pocket and catastrophic 
health-related payments, which have a significant 
impact on poverty. High-cost healthcare, not cov-
ered by basic micro-insurance for health, is still a 
significant impoverishing expense for the poor. 
As micro-insurance schemes for health expand, 
strong efforts will be needed to design a financially-
viable insurance product that covers surgeries and 
high-cost medical services to meet the needs of the 
poor. 
Micro-insurance can serve the interests of poor 
populations with risk-pooling to manage unpre-
dictable employment, flows of income, and catas-
trophic events. To ensure that micro-insurance 
safeguards the assets and interests of the poor, mi-
cro-insurance initiatives must exercise professional 
management, product development, management 
information systems, and re-insurance.  
ACKNOwLEDgEMENTS
This work was made possible through funding pro-
vided by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
to ICDDR,B and was undertaken as work for the 
Social Exclusion Knowledge Network established as Werner WJ Micro-insurance in Bangladesh
JHPN 572
part of the WHO Commission on the Social Deter-
minants of Health. The views presented in this pa-
per are those of the author and do not necessarily 
represent the decisions, policy, or views of WHO or 
Commissioners.
REFERENCES 
1.  Carr D. Improving the health of the world’s poorest 
people. Health Bull 2004;(1):1-34.
2.  Roth J, McCord M, Liber D. The landscape of micro-
insurance in the world’s 100 poorest countries. Ap-
pleton, WI: MicroInsurance Centre, Limited Liability 
Company, 2007. 107 p.
3.  World Health Organization. Core health indicators 
database: 2004 data. (http://www.who.int, accessed 
on 2 June 2007). 
4.  International Labour Organization. Micro health 
insurance: profile of community based schemes in 
Bangladesh. Dhaka: Women’s Empowerment through 
Employment and Health, International Labour Or-
ganization Bangladesh, 2003:3-43.
5.  Van Doorslaer E, O’Donnell O, Rannan-Eliya RP, 
Somanathan A, Adhikari SR, Garg CC et al. Catas-
trophic payments for health care in Asia. Health Econ 
2007;16:1159-84.
6.  Xu K, Evans DB, Kawabata K, Zeramdini R, Klavus J, 
Murray CJ. Household catastrophic health expendi-
ture: a multicountry analysis. Lancet 2003;362:111-7.
7.  O’Donnell, Owen, van Doorslaer E, Rannan-Eliya 
RP, Somanathan A, Adhikari SR et al. The incidence of 
public spending on healthcare: comparative evidence 
from Asia. World Bank Econ Rev 2003;21:93-123.
8.  Frenk J, Poverty, health and social protection. In: 
Proceedings of International Conference on Social 
Health Insurance in Developing Countries. Esch-
born: Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische, 2005:1. 
(www.shi-conference.de/berlin_2005_1.php, acces-
sed on 31 May 2007).
9.  International Labour Organization. Micro insurers: 
inventory of micro  insurance schemes in Bangla-
desh. Dhaka: Women’s Empowerment through Em-
ployment and Health Project, International Labour 
Organization Bangladesh, 2003. 57 p.
10.	Ahmed	M,	Islam	SK,	Quashem	M,	Ahmed	N.	Health	
microinsurance: a comparative study of three exam-
ples in Bangladesh. Washington, DC: CGAP Working 
Group on Microinsurance, World Bank, 2005:1-61. 
(Good and bad practices case study no. 13).
11. International Labour Organization. Grameen Kalyan 
and BRAC: assessment of micro health insurance 
schemes. Dhaka: Women’s Empowerment through 
Employment and Health Project, International La-
bour Organization Bangladesh, 2004. 42 p.
12. Begum S, Sen B. Unsustainable livelihoods, health 
shocks and urban chronic poverty: rickshaw pullers 
as a case study. Manchester: Chronic Poverty Re-
search Centre, 2004. 26 p. (Chronic Poverty Research 
Centre working paper no. 46).
13. Radermacher R, Wig N, van Putten-Rademaker O, 
Müller V, Dror D. Yeshasvini Trust. Washington, DC: 
CGAP Working Group on Microinsurance, World 
Bank, 2005:45. (Good and bad practices case study 
no. 20).
14. Garand D. VimoSEWA: India. Washington, DC: 
CGAP Working Group on Microinsurance, World 
Bank, 2005:49. (Good and bad practices case study 
no. 16).
15. van Doorslaer E, O’Donnell O, Rannan-Eliya RP, So-
manathan A, Adhikari SR, Garg CC. Effect of pay-
ments for healthcare on poverty estimates in 11 
countries in Asia: an analysis of household survey 
data. Lancet 2006;368:1357-64.
16. Xu K, Evans DB, Carrin G, Aguilar-Rivera AM. 
Designing health financing systems to reduce ca-
tas-trophic health expenditure. Geneva: World 
Health Organization, 2005. 8 p. (Technical briefs for 
policy-makers no. 2).
17. McCord  MJ,  Churchill  C.  Delta  Life,  Bangla-
desh. Washington, DC: Consultative Group to As-
sist the Poor Working Group on Microinsurance, 
World  Bank,  2005:1-65.  (Good  and  bad  practices 
case study no. 7). (http://www.microfinancegateway.
org/p/site/m// template.rc/1.9.26113, accessed on 2 
June 2009).Werner WJ Micro-insurance in Bangladesh
Volume 27 | Number 4 | August 2009 573
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
.
 
T
y
p
e
s
 
o
f
 
m
i
c
r
o
-
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
 
f
o
r
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
v
e
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
r
s
 
i
n
 
B
a
n
g
l
a
d
e
s
h
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
s
t
i
n
g
 
e
x
a
m
p
l
e
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
I
n
d
i
a
 
(
9
,
1
0
,
1
4
,
1
7
)
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
P
r
o
v
i
d
e
r
P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
p
r
o
fi
l
e
 
o
f
 
s
u
b
s
c
r
i
b
e
r
s
C
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
P
r
e
m
i
u
m
M
i
c
r
o
-
 
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
 
f
o
r
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
G
r
a
m
e
e
n
 
K
a
l
y
a
n
,
 
S
o
c
i
e
t
y
 
f
o
r
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
,
 
B
R
A
C
,
 
e
t
c
.
*
B
a
n
g
l
a
d
e
s
h
:
 
1
1
5
,
0
0
0
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
-
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
,
 
5
6
0
,
0
0
0
 
l
i
v
e
s
 
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
;
 
L
i
m
i
t
e
d
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
s
W
o
m
e
n
,
 
m
i
c
r
o
c
r
e
d
i
t
 
m
e
m
-
b
e
r
s
.
P
o
o
r
 
a
n
d
 
u
l
t
r
a
-
p
o
o
r
 
h
o
u
s
e
-
h
o
l
d
s
 
i
n
 
a
r
e
a
 
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
 
b
y
 
m
i
c
r
o
-
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
B
a
s
i
c
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
e
v
e
n
t
a
t
i
v
e
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
:
 
c
o
n
s
u
l
t
a
t
i
o
n
,
i
m
m
u
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
a
n
d
 
f
a
m
i
l
y
-
p
l
a
n
n
i
n
g
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
N
o
r
m
a
l
 
d
e
l
i
v
e
r
y
1
0
-
4
0
%
 
d
i
s
c
o
u
n
t
 
o
n
 
m
e
d
i
c
i
n
e
s
 
5
0
%
 
d
i
s
c
o
u
n
t
 
o
n
 
p
a
t
h
o
l
o
g
y
 
t
e
s
t
s
H
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
u
p
 
t
o
 
T
k
 
1
,
0
0
0
 
(
U
S
$
 
1
4
)
S
S
S
 
c
o
v
e
r
s
 
s
u
r
g
e
r
y
 
(
c
o
-
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
 
i
s
 
T
k
 
3
,
0
0
0
 
(
U
S
$
 
4
4
)
V
a
r
i
e
s
 
b
y
 
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
-
t
i
o
n
T
k
 
2
0
-
4
8
0
 
p
e
r
 
y
e
a
r
(
U
S
$
 
0
.
3
0
-
7
.
0
 
p
e
r
 
y
e
a
r
)
T
k
 
1
0
-
2
0
 
(
U
S
$
 
0
.
1
5
-
0
.
3
0
)
 
c
o
-
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
s
o
m
e
 
s
c
h
e
m
e
s
M
i
c
r
o
-
 
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
 
f
o
r
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
Y
e
s
h
a
s
v
i
n
i
†
I
n
d
i
a
:
 
1
.
4
5
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
p
e
o
p
l
e
 
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
 
i
n
 
K
a
r
n
a
t
a
k
a
L
o
w
-
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
b
u
t
 
n
o
t
 
u
l
t
r
a
-
p
o
o
r
C
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
v
e
 
m
e
m
b
e
r
s
,
 
w
o
r
k
 
i
n
 
a
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
a
l
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
:
 
R
s
 
1
,
5
0
0
 
(
U
S
$
 
3
4
)
 
p
e
r
 
m
o
n
t
h
,
 
6
0
%
 
m
a
l
e
,
 
4
0
%
 
f
e
m
a
l
e
C
o
v
e
r
s
 
1
,
6
0
0
 
t
y
p
e
s
 
o
f
 
s
u
r
g
e
r
i
e
s
 
a
t
 
n
e
t
-
w
o
r
k
 
h
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
s
M
a
x
i
m
u
m
 
b
e
n
e
fi
t
 
p
e
r
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
 
p
e
r
 
y
e
a
r
—
R
s
 
2
0
0
,
0
0
0
 
f
o
r
 
a
n
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
 
o
f
 
R
s
 
1
2
0
R
s
 
1
2
0
 
(
U
S
$
 
2
.
7
5
)
 
p
e
r
 
y
e
a
r
 
p
e
r
 
a
d
u
l
t
c
h
i
l
d
–
5
0
%
 
I
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
e
d
 
I
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
V
i
m
o
S
E
W
A
I
n
d
i
a
:
 
1
1
0
,
0
0
0
 
i
n
s
u
r
e
d
 
l
i
v
e
s
 
(
2
0
0
4
)
 
i
n
 
G
u
-
j
a
r
a
t
,
 
e
x
p
a
n
d
-
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
s
t
a
t
e
s
N
e
a
r
 
o
r
 
b
e
l
o
w
 
p
o
v
e
r
t
y
-
l
i
n
e
,
 
1
0
0
%
 
w
o
r
k
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
l
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
O
n
l
y
 
w
o
m
e
n
 
c
a
n
 
t
a
k
e
 
o
u
t
 
p
o
l
i
c
i
e
s
E
v
e
n
t
:
 
M
a
x
i
m
u
m
 
c
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
N
a
t
u
r
a
l
 
d
e
a
t
h
:
 
R
s
 
5
,
0
0
0
 
(
U
S
$
 
1
1
4
)
 
H
e
a
l
t
h
:
 
R
s
 
2
,
0
0
0
 
(
U
S
$
 
4
5
)
A
s
s
e
t
 
a
n
d
 
l
o
s
s
:
 
R
s
 
1
0
,
0
0
0
 
(
U
S
$
 
2
2
7
)
A
c
c
i
d
e
n
t
a
l
 
d
e
a
t
h
:
 
R
s
 
4
0
,
0
0
0
 
(
U
S
$
 
9
0
9
)
S
p
o
u
s
e
 
a
c
c
i
d
e
n
t
a
l
 
d
e
a
t
h
:
 
R
s
 
1
5
,
0
0
0
 
(
U
S
$
 
5
.
7
0
)
R
s
 
2
5
0
 
(
U
S
$
 
5
.
7
0
)
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
*
A
 
f
u
l
l
 
p
r
o
fi
l
e
 
o
f
 
1
1
 
m
i
c
r
o
-
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
 
s
c
h
e
m
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
i
n
 
B
a
n
g
l
a
d
e
s
h
 
i
s
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
I
L
O
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
(
9
)
,
 
a
n
d
 
d
e
t
a
i
l
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
B
R
A
C
,
 
G
r
a
m
e
e
n
 
K
a
l
y
a
n
,
 
a
n
d
 
S
S
S
 
m
i
c
r
o
-
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
 
s
c
h
e
m
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
 
a
r
e
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
b
y
 
A
h
m
e
d
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
1
0
)
;
 
†
F
u
l
l
 
d
e
t
a
i
l
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
Y
e
s
h
a
v
i
n
i
 
M
H
I
 
s
c
h
e
m
e
 
a
r
e
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
b
y
 
R
a
d
e
r
m
a
c
h
e
r
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
1
3
)
;
 
S
S
S
=
S
o
c
i
e
t
y
 
f
o
r
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s